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Spatial Attention and Perception: Seeing without paint 
 
A Tanesini 
 
 
Abstract: Covert spatial attention alters the way things look. Objects situated at 
attended locations appear bigger, closer, if striped, stripier than qualitatively 
indiscernible counterparts whose locations are unattended. These results cannot be 
easily explained in terms of the number and kind of perceived properties of objects. 
Nor do they appear to be cases of visual illusions. Ned Block has argued that these 
results are best accounted for by invoking what he calls ‘mental paint’. In this paper I 
argue, instead, for an account of these phenomena in terms of the perception of action 
scaled affordances concerning saccadic eye movement. As part of the argument I 
draw connections with the empirical literature on the way in which performance 
efficiency alters visual appearance. 
 
 
 
Attention alters the way things look. There is incontrovertible empirical evidence 
showing that objects situated at attended locations appear bigger, closer, if striped, 
stripier than qualitatively indiscernible counterparts whose locations are unattended. 
The colours of their surfaces look more saturated. In experimental conditions the 
onset of a dot in an attended portion of a screen seemed earlier than a simultaneous 
dot situated at a less attended location. Similarly the flicker rate of flickering objects 
seems faster when we attend to their locations.1 At first sight these are not instances 
                                                 
1 For results concerning spatial frequency and gap size see (Gobell & Carrasco, 2005); for colour 
saturation (Fuller & Carrasco, 2006); for motion coherence (Liu, Fuller, & Carrasco, 2006); for flicker 
rate (Montagna & Carrasco, 2006); for speed (Turatto, Vescovi, & Valsecchi, 2007); and for size of a 
moving object (Anton-Erxleben, Henrich, & Treue, 2007). 
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where the deployment of selective attention merely facilitates the perception of a 
greater number of (more determinate) properties of the objects of perception.2 
One can contrast these cases with other more familiar examples. For instance, 
an object might look red, however when we pay closer attention we might perceive it 
as being crimson or another specific hue of red. Examples such as this one can be 
explained by noting that selective attention allows us to experience both more 
determinate properties of objects (e.g., crimson rather than red) and a larger number 
of them (e.g., crimson and red rather than red only). However, the increased acuity 
that attention brings to perception could not, it would seem, explain why an object 
situated at an attended location looks bigger than another object of the same size 
whose location is not attended even though there is no change in illumination 
conditions or in distance to the perceiver. This phenomenon seems unsuitable for an 
explanation in terms of the number and kind of properties of objects which are 
perceived. 
These observations might lead to the conclusion that perceptual illusions are 
surprisingly common. Although, strictly speaking, experiments in this area concern 
comparative experiences of objects, some whose locations are attended and others 
which are similar but whose locations are unattended, they warrant the counter-to-fact 
claim that objects appear bigger, and stripier if striped, when their locations are 
attended than those same objects would when placed at unattended locations. 
Consequently, it would seem that either attention systematically distorts perception, 
so that every time one attends to something, one misperceives it, or if the experience 
of objects at attended locations is not illusory, then it is experience when attention is 
directed elsewhere that is always illusory. Neither conclusion is, in my opinion, 
satisfactory. Whilst perceptual illusions are not rare, a position according to which the 
majority of experiences are at least in part illusory should, if at all possible, be 
avoided. 
The challenge, therefore, is to explain how objects at attended locations could 
look bigger, closer, their colours more saturated than they would if their locations 
were unattended without claiming that either case involves some kind of perceptual 
                                                 
2
 In this paper I use the term ‘perception’ to refer to the successful cases of detection of objects and 
properties by mean of the senses. I shall not presume that all perception is conscious. I shall reserve the 
term ‘experience’ to conscious states of sensory awareness. Thus, experiences include both conscious 
perceptions and illusions as well as hallucinations. This is not to say that there are experiences which 
are common to all of these cases. 
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illusion. A natural response, one that has been adopted by Ned Block in ‘Attention 
and Mental Paint’ (2010), is to account for this phenomenon by invoking features that 
pertain to the manner (or mode) in which objects are represented in experience rather 
than to those objects themselves or to the contents of perception. According to this 
view, experiences of the same object in the same conditions when attending to its 
location and when not so attending would share the same representational content, but 
would differ in the manner or mode in which things are experienced. It is this 
difference in manner or mode that Block, borrowing the expression from Gilbert 
Harman (1990), labels “mental paint”. 
Block defends this view by arguing that the examples under discussion cannot, 
once it has been granted that we are not dealing with perceptual illusions, be 
explained either by direct realists or by representationists. Representationists who 
claim that the phenomenal character (the look) of a perception is determined by its 
representational content (what it represents) would not be able to explain the 
examples under discussion because in these cases the representational contents are the 
same but the characters of these experiences differ.3 Direct realists would also fail 
because these are experiences of the same objects and properties but whose 
phenomenology nevertheless differs.4 More specifically, Block claims that his 
opponents would have to be able to invoke properties which (A) are experienced in 
the one, but not in the other case and (B) would be of the kind to which there can be a 
corresponding phenomenal look capable of explaining the phenomena. However, 
Block argues, in these cases there are no such properties. 
Block further shores up this conclusion by remarking that those changes in 
phenomenal character which are brought about by shifts in attention do not even look 
like changes in the world (Block, 2010, p. 53). This is why, in Block’s opinion, it is 
much more plausible to place the explanatory burden on the mental side and postulate 
the existence of qualities that do not pertain to the perceived objects or to what is 
                                                 
3
 By ‘phenomenal character’ I mean what it is that we are aware of when we have the experience. Thus, 
I do not take phenomenal character to be a property of the experience itself. See Fish (2010, p. 17) for 
an explanation of these two distinct interpretations of this notion. 
4
 In this paper I adopt both Block’s terminology and characterizations for these two families of views. 
Arguably, his presentation fails to do justice to some of their more sophisticated versions. The account 
offered here suggests that even the most hard-nosed reductivist versions of representationists have a 
response to Block’s objections. 
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represented in perception but to the manner or way in which these objects are 
represented.5 
This paper aims to provide an account of the changes in phenomenal character 
brought about by shifts of covert spatial attention which makes no reference to modes 
of representation. Instead, as in ordinary cases of selective attention, differences in the 
phenomenology can be explained in terms of the properties which are represented in 
perception or which figure among the objects of experience. More specifically, I 
argue that when one attends to the location of an object, one experiences affordances 
or action properties that cannot be consciously perceived otherwise. Notable among 
these are those action-scaled affordances involving saccadic eye movements. 
The paper consists of five sections. In the first  I summarise two kinds of 
experimental results: one which shows that spatial attention alters the appearance of 
things; the other concerns the way in which visual appearance is altered by 
performance efficiency. In the second section I briefly reconstruct Block’s argument 
for mental paint. In the third I explain the notion of an affordance. This notion is used 
in the fourth section to provide an explanation of the results concerning covert spatial 
attention discussed in section 1 which dispenses with any kind of mental paint. This is 
an explanation that could be adopted by direct realists or by representationists.6 
Further, this account reveals some similarities between the effects of covert attention 
and of performance efficiency on experience. In both kinds of case experience is 
altered because of changes in what the environment affords to the perceiver. In the 
final section I consider the possible objection that the kinds of look associated with 
affordances are of the wrong sort to explain the way in which attention alters 
experience, and show how this objection can be addressed. In this section I also 
explain how, despite differences in phenomenal character, both the attended and 
unattended cases are instances of perception. 
 
 
1. Some empirical results 
 
                                                 
5
 I use ‘object’ here to refer to anything which can figure as an object of experience. Thus properties as 
well as things are included. Hereafter, it should be clear in context when I use ‘object’ with this sense. 
6
 Or at least could be adopted given the considerations offered in this paper. There might however be 
other features of affordances that support arguments in favour of one of these two families of positions. 
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Work in psychology on the relation between perception and attention often focuses on 
enhanced sensitivity to features such as contrast or fineness of patterning7. Sensitivity 
is measured behaviourally often using Posner’s cuing paradigm. In these experiments 
participants have to respond as quickly as possible by pressing a button (or similar) to 
a peripheral target whose onset follows a central cue (which is also symbolic such as 
an arrow) or a peripheral one (which is also non-symbolic such as the whole quadrant 
being briefly illuminated) (Cf. Carrasco, 2011, p. 1488; Styles, 2006, pp. 52-4). The 
cue has the effect of attracting attention to a portion of the visual field; and when the 
cue is valid, and thus correctly indicates the location of a subsequent target, 
participants were faster in locating the target compared to when the cue offered no 
indication of its location or when it was invalid. These results suggest that attention, 
which is drawn to a location by the cue, enhances sensitivity to the onset of a target as 
measured in terms of reaction times. 
The sort of sensitivity with which these experiments are concerned has no 
direct connection with experience. The participants who react faster after being 
presented a valid cue are not aware of this fact; the difference is measured in 
milliseconds. More recently, however, there has been work on the relation between 
attention and perceptual appearance. This work, conducted by Marisa Carrasco and 
her lab, is concerned with the experience of contrast, colour saturation and  flicker 
rate (see note 1 for references). In particular, Carrasco and her team developed a new 
paradigm to test subjective contrast in order to study the effect of spatial attention on 
perceptual appearance (Carrasco, Ling and Read, 2004). Block’s argument in favour 
of mental paint is based on the effects discovered by Carrasco. In what follows I 
briefly present these experimental results before turning to Block’s argument in the 
next section. 
These results are concerned with subjective or perceived contrast.8 The first 
set of experiments concerned involuntary (exogenous) covert spatial visual attention. 
This form of attention is spatial because it is directed at locations rather than objects 
or features (Carrasco, 2011, p. 1486). It is covert (as opposed to overt) because a shift 
in attention has been achieved without any movement of the eye (Styles, 2006, pp. 56-
                                                 
7Spatial resolution is the ability to detect fine patterns. Attention has been shown to enhance this 
ability. For an overview see Carrasco, 2011, p. 1500. 
8
 Contrast is defined as the result of subtracting the lower luminance of the darker areas from the higher 
luminance of the lighter area divided by the average luminance. ‘Perceived contrast’ is intended to 
refer to what it is like to experience a given contrast. 
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7; Carrasco, 2011, pp. 1487). In this case, one looks one way but attends another. It is 
involuntary, transient or exogenous, rather than voluntary, endogenous, or sustained 
because attention has shifted involuntarily as a result of something capturing one’s 
attention at the periphery of one’s field (a phenomenon aptly known as ‘Attentional 
Capture’) (Styles, 2006, pp. 54-57; Carrasco, 2011, pp. 1487-89). 
Participants were asked to fix their gaze onto one point; they were then either 
presented with a neutral cue (to establish a baseline) or a peripheral cue (that attracted 
their exogenous attention) followed after an interval by the onset of the stimuli 
consisting of a couple of Gabor patches with different orientations. A Gabor patch is a 
sinusoidal luminance pattern with a fixed contrast (see Figure 2). Participants were 
asked to press a button to indicate the pattern orientation of the patch that looked 
higher in contrast (See Figure 1). The results showed that exogenous covert spatial 
visual attention makes a statistically significant difference to perceived contrast so 
that when a patch is situated at the attended location its relative contrast is 
experienced to be higher than that of a comparable but unattended patch (Carrasco 
Ling and Read, 2004 and Carrasco 2011).9 Another set of experiments showed similar 
effects could be found for endogenous (voluntary and sustained) covert spatial visual 
attention (Liu, Abrams and Carrasco, 2009).10 Thus, both voluntary and involuntary 
covert attention have the effect of making the contrast between dark and light areas of 
the pattern of Gabor patches appear higher than it would otherwise. 
 
Fig. 1 
From Carrasco, Ling and Read (2004). Reproduced with permission by the author 
                                                 
9
 For ease of exposition, and following Carrasco’s and Block’s usage, I will sometimes use the 
expressions ‘attended stimulus’ or ‘attended patch’ as shorthand for ‘attended location at which the 
stimulus (patch) is situated’. It is important to remember, however, that strictly speaking this paper is 
exclusively concerned with visual spatial attention; that is to say, visual attention directed at spatial 
locations. 
10
 Subsequent experiments have shown the existence of similar effects of covert transient or exogenous 
attention for other properties such as colour saturation, gap size, flicker rate, speed, motion coherence 
and size of moving objects (see note 1 for references). 
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In addition to results obtained by the Carrasco laboratory and discussed by Block, 
there is an apparently unrelated literature on the effects of performance efficacy on 
the phenomenology of visual experience. Players of ball games have often claimed 
that the ball looks bigger when they are in form. For instance, the legendary cricketer 
D. W. Grace has been reported as saying that when one is ‘in’ (that is, one has spent 
time at the crease) one sees the ball as big as a football (Porritt in Davie and Davie, 
1987, p. 120). Similar remarks have been made by golfers and by baseball players. 
More recently, Jessica Witt and Dennis Proffitt have set to examine the veridicality of 
these anecdotal reports. In a series of experiments that involved asking participants to 
make judgements about the size of a baseball by matching it to one of eight black 
circles in a display, Witt and Proffitt found that there is a statistically significant 
correlation between high batting average and matching the ball to one of the bigger 
circles (Witt and Proffitt, 2005a). Other experiments show that when one holds a tool 
which one intends to use, and that makes a target object reachable, that object is 
judged to be closer than it would if one did not hold the tool or did not intend to use it 
(Witt and Proffitt, 2005b). Similarly, individuals wearing heavy rucksacks, when 
compared to unencumbered subjects, judge on the basis of visual experience slopes to 
be steeper (Bhalla and Proffitt, 1999) and target objects to be further way (Proffitt and 
al. 2003). 
Strictly speaking, these findings concern participants’ verbal responses based 
on their visual experiences, but together with Witt, Proffitt and their colleagues I shall 
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assume here that these responses are explained by relevant changes in the visual 
experiences themselves.11 Hence, I take these experiments to show that the 
opportunities for action offered by things in their layouts shape our visual experience 
of these things. More specifically, they show that subjects consciously perceive 
features of the environment, like egocentric distance, as affordances understood as a 
function of both objective features of the layout (e.g., actual extent) and effort (cf. 
Proffitt et al., 2003, pp. 111-12). In a nutshell, we experience the world at least in part 
in terms of ‘our abilities to act on it’ (Witt and Proffitt, 2008, p. 1479). 
It might be thought that the work on how covert spatial attention alters 
phenomenal appearance bears no relation to the work on how performance efficiency 
or effort also alters the appearances of things. Thus, one might claim that a result 
showing that the perception of affordances shapes visual experiences does not shed 
any light on how attention alters the way things appear. This conclusion would be 
premature. The key connection between the two sets of experiments is the role that 
motor planning plays in both. First, there is strong evidence that we experience the 
world in terms of affordances because conscious perception is influenced by the 
outcome of planning for the movements of eye and limbs (Witt and Proffitt, 2008; 
Kirsch et al. 2012).12 Second, recent work has shown that preparation for saccadic eye 
movement alters the perceived contrast of Gabor patches in ways that are very similar 
to the alteration caused by covert attention (Rolfs and Carrasco, 2012). Third, the 
existence of a close link between covert spatial attention with motor planning of 
saccadic eye movements is well-established. Some brain areas are involved both in 
the control of covert attention and in motor preparation of saccadic eye-movement 
(Moore and Fallah, 2001). It has even been suggested by supporters of the premotor 
theory of covert spatial attention that this kind of attention is functionally equivalent 
to motor preparation for goal directed activities. In their view covert attention to a 
location in space would be the phenomenal manifestation of preparation for planned 
movement (Rizzolatti et al., 1987). 
                                                 
11
 This conclusion seems the best explanation of the experimental evidence. However, in this paper I 
shall not offer an argument in support of the claim that these properties are consciously perceived 
rather than inferred on the basis of perception. Instead I shall, to some extent, simply assume that they 
experienced. Arguments for a similar conclusion have been put forward by Nanay (2011 and 2012). It 
should be added, however, that the argument in sects. 4 and 5 below offers some considerations in 
favour of taking affordances to be among the objects of experience. 
12
 I do not intended to suggest here or anywhere else in this paper that only affordances are perceived. 
Rather, affordances are among the objects of perception. These also include things and their properties. 
Final Draft 
 
 - 9 - 
I shall return to these issues, but for now I wish to put forward the following 
argument which I shall flesh out and defend in sect. 4 below. There is conclusive 
empirical evidence that motor planning influences conscious perception. More 
specifically, we do perceive the environment partly in terms of our ability to act on it. 
Further, this perception of affordances is manifested in experience. Thus, since 
behavioural studies have shown that motor preparation for saccadic eye movement 
enhances the appearance of contrast in ways that are comparable to alterations 
engendered by covert attention, and given the close connection between covert spatial 
attention and motor planning for saccades, it seems at least plausible that in this case 
also the character of experience can be explained in terms of the perception of 
affordances. It is one of the burdens of section 4 to make the case for this conclusion. 
 
 
2. Block’s Argument for Mental Paint 
 
Block argues that Carrasco’s results offer strong evidence for the view that the 
phenomenal character of experience cannot be fully explained either in terms of direct 
awareness of objects (and perhaps their properties) as the direct realist would have it 
or in terms of the representation of these objects (and properties) as is advocated by 
some supporters of representationism. Instead, Block claims that these experiments 
show that any account of the phenomenology of experience must resort to invoking 
something else. This something else is what he dubs ‘mental paint’. Given his 
commitment to physicalism, Block does not envisage this paint to be tantamount to a 
quale (a purely qualitative intrinsic feature of experience). Instead, he presumes that 
mental paint will turn out to be reducible to some neural features of perception (2010, 
n 2, p. 56). What matters for the purposes of his paper is not the exact nature of this 
extra dimension of the phenomenal character of experience. Instead, his main concern 
is to show that this extra dimension is required so that both direct realists and those 
representationists who wish either to identify phenomenal character with 
representational content or to reduce the former to the latter are shown to be mistaken. 
What follows is a reconstruction of what I take to be the structure of Block’s 
argument. 
 
Fig. 2 
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Partially reproduced from Carrasco, Ling and Read (2004) with permission of the author 
 
 
 
Call ‘E1’ the experience one of the participants in Carrasco’s experiment has of the 
leftmost Gabor patch in Fig. 2 when her attention is not drawn to that patch and call 
‘E2’ the experience that she has of the same patch when her attention is drawn to it 
because of the onset of an earlier cue. It is assumed that all other relevant factors 
(distance, illumination conditions, etc) are invariant in the two cases. 
 
Premise 1: Experiences E1 and E2 have different phenomenal characters. 
Premise 2: The difference in phenomenal character is a genuine perceptual effect. 
Premise 3: Neither E1 nor E2 is an illusion. 
Premise 4a: There is no difference in the kind or number of objects (and properties) 
that one is directly aware of in E1 and E2 
Alternatively, 
Premise 4b: There is no difference in the number or kind of properties represented 
in experience in E1 and E2. 
Therefore, 
Conclusion 5: Something other than the objects and properties one is aware of or 
represents in experience must account for the difference in phenomenal 
character between E1 and E2. 
Conclusion 6: The best candidate for this something else is mental paint. 
 
Block’s opponents must reject at least one of these premises.  In this section I 
focus on Block’s arguments in favour of premise 4 whilst granting the truth of 
premise 1, 2 and 3. It is worth noting, however, that none of these is absolutely 
beyond question at least with regard to the effects found by Carrasco.13 In section 4 I 
offer reasons to reject Block’s arguments. 
                                                 
13
 Premise 1 could be challenged since Carrasco’s experiments involve force choice snapshot 
judgements which might be guided by unconscious enhanced sensitivity to contrast in attended regions 
of space. Block’s defence of premise 2 is based exclusively on the claim that Carrasco’s effects are 
subject to visual adaptation. Thus, he is able to exclude the possibility that they are a result of cognitive 
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Premise 4a expresses the crux of Block’s case against direct realism. The 
direct realist claims that the phenomenal character of a conscious perception is 
constituted by the objects, properties and layout of which one is directly aware. 
However, in Block’s view there is no difference in this regard between E1 and E2 
because there is no difference in the environment in the two cases. Further, the 
phenomenal difference in the two cases cannot be explained by claiming that there are 
determinate properties of which one is aware in the one case but not in the other 
because the change is not experienced as a move from generic to more specific, but as 
a difference in contrast (at the same level of specificity) (2010, p. 43). 
Block considers two possible responses from the direct realist. The first would 
be to claim that one is directly aware of the focus of attention as it shifts. It is this 
awareness of the property of being-the focus of attention which is instantiated by the 
left hand patch in E2 but not in E1. Awareness of this property would explain the 
difference in phenomenology between the two perceptions. Block dismisses this 
response because, in his view, it is tantamount to conceding the existence of mental 
paint as being the focus of attention plausibly pertains to the way in which one is 
aware of things rather than to those things of which one is aware (2010, p. 43). 
The second response, which in Block’s opinion is an improvement on the first, 
treats attention as constituting, at least partly, the relation of direct awareness. 
Nevertheless, Block claims that this response is of no help. Although it could perhaps 
explain why an attended object looks more salient than it otherwise would, it cannot 
explain why it would look bigger or stripier or as having a higher contrast. And yet it 
is precisely these phenomena that need explaining (2010, p. 44). 
                                                                                                                                            
bias. But he cannot establish that they are due to the phenomenology of perception rather than to that of 
attention. As a matter of fact, some earlier studies on how attention alters appearance explicitly identify 
the phenomenon as one pertaining to the phenomenology of attention and thus concerning “attensity” 
(the phenomenal quality of attended objects) rather than to the phenomenology of perception 
(Prinzmetal et al, 1997). In defence of premise 3 Block contrasts the results of the Carrasco 
experiments with other cases where he acknowledges that attention gives rise to illusions (Cf., Tse, 
2005).This is also not dissimilar from the distorting effect of pro-attitudes that make us, for instance, 
treat desired objects as if they were closer to us than they really are as revealed by both verbal reports 
and actions toward the objects (Balcetis and Dunning, 2010). Nevertheless, I am inclined to concede 
something akin to premise 3 because attention is not an all or nothing phenomenon. It is a matter of 
degrees. Thus, when we look we might pay attention to more than one point in space; we might attend 
to a whole area whilst attending more to some portions of it than to others (Cf. Carrasco, 2011, p. 
1487). This shows that the boundaries of attention are vague; it might also be the case that the 
boundaries between illusion and perception are vague insofar as it might be true that there are 
borderline cases. However, the vagueness of the boundaries of attention present in most cases of 
perception would mean that almost every case is on borderline between illusion and perception. 
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Block raises similar issues in his attack against representationism whose crux I 
have expressed by means of 4b. Like her direct realist opponent, the representationist 
cannot invoke any features of the environment which because they are represented in 
the one case but not in the other explain the difference in phenomenal character 
between E1 and E2. In particular, also like the direct realist and for the same reason, 
the representationist cannot invoke a move from determinable to determinate 
properties since the difference in look between E1 and E2 is not a difference between 
a more generic and a more specific look. Thus, although a distinct look would 
correspondent to each of the represented properties, these are not looks that would 
explain the phenomena. 
Obviously, since both E1 and E2 are said to be perceptions, the 
representationist cannot invoke the possibility of misrepresentation to explain the 
difference in phenomenal character between the two (Block, 2010, pp. 49-50). The 
representationist might resort to responses similar to those Block attributes to the 
direct realist, but in Block’s view such an adoption would suffer from the same flaws 
mentioned above. There is, however, an extra string to the representationist’s bow: 
she can invoke vague contents to explain the difference between E1 and E2. Block is 
sympathetic to this response as he thinks that the contents of E1 and E2 are indeed 
vague and that their vagueness explains how they can be different and yet both pertain 
to perceptions. Thus the content of E1 would include a range of contrasts and that of 
E2 a different higher range, as both of these would include 22%, both contents are 
true. 
Despite his endorsement of vague contents, Block denies that they can explain 
the relevant difference in the phenomenal characters of E1 and E2. This is because the 
only one look that could correspond to a vague content is a fuzzy look, but neither E1 
nor E2 are experienced as fuzzy (p. 52). Alternatively, one could say that what flows 
from vague contents is not a single look but a disjunction of looks one for each 
determinate contrast in the ranges. This move would not help since a disjunction of 
looks is not one way in which something could look (p. 52). So either the look 
corresponding to the vague content is not of the right sort to explain the phenomena or 
there is not a single look which is determined by the vague contents. Either way, 
Block concludes that representationism also fails. 
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3. Defining Affordances 
 
Block’s argument is predicated on the assumption that the range of properties 
and objects that can be represented in perception or figure among the objects of 
experience is rather limited. More specifically, Block has ignored the possibility that 
affordances or action properties are perceived and could contribute to the 
phenomenology of perceptual experience. In this section I clarify the notion of an 
affordance or action property before in the next arguing that the phenomenological 
effects highlighted in the two kinds of cases I have presented in the first section could 
be explained in terms of the perception of these properties. 
We owe the notion of an affordance to James J. Gibson who first defined it as 
‘what [the environment] offers the animal… either for good or ill’ (1986, p. 127).14 
Thus conceived affordances are relative to a subject or animal. Examples would 
include the climbability of a staircase by a biped or the graspability of a ball by a 
creature with an opposing thumb. Although the notion of an affordance was first 
developed in the context of ecological psychology, its current use does not imply a 
commitment to that approach. In this paper I am simply agnostic about this 
approach’s utility or correctness. 
There is no agreed upon view of the ontology of affordances.15 I shall not 
attempt to settle this issue here. For my purposes it is sufficient to spell out those 
features of these properties which are needed to develop the argument in the next 
section that, if they are consciously perceived, their experience explains why, for 
example, objects at attended locations look to have higher contrast and also why, for 
instance, slopes look steeper to tired people than they do to those who are rested. 
Affordances are something akin to possibilities for action. They are features of 
the environment which are relative to a given animal. Typically affordances can be 
characterised as follows: Object o in situation s affords φ-ing for animal a. Thus, for 
instance, staircase o (with risers of a given height) in situation s (it is dry and well-lit) 
affords climbing for animal a. To say that the staircase in the given situation affords 
climbing for a given animal is to claim that animal a can climb the staircase in that 
                                                 
14
 The view that I defend here differs from Gibson’s in some respects. Importantly, I take objects and 
their properties to be perceivable as well as affordances. Gibson claimed that only the latter are 
perceived.  
15Heft has argued that they are properties of the environment understood as resources for the organism 
(1989). Turvey has argued that they are dispositional properties (1992). Chemero (2003) has claimed 
that they are relations between features of situations and abilities of organisms. 
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given situation. I shall not spell out the nature of the modality involved in 
affordances; but, intuitively, the thought I am trying to express is that if animal a 
attempted to climb the staircase in that situation or relevantly similar ones, then it 
would succeed in a large number of cases.16 
Even from this brief characterisation a few distinguishing features of the 
notion of affordance adopted here should be clear. First, the affordances I am 
interested in are possibilities; they are not, as Merleau-Ponty (1995) suggested, 
demands that the environment makes on the animal. Second, they are not relative to 
the animal’s needs or interests. Thus, I am not considering cases where one perceives 
an object as an obstacle, or another as food. Instead, my discussion is only concerned 
with affordance as opportunities for actions offered by objects in given situations 
which are exclusively relative to the animal’s motor abilities (which are in part 
determined by its anatomy and biomechanical limitations). So conceived, and as 
Gibson himself held, affordances can exist unperceived either because no animal is 
present or because the animal fails to perceive them. 
Something more needs to be said about the notion of an activity which is 
crucial to my definition of affordance. An activity is a doing; it is something that an 
animal performs as opposed to something which is done to it by another thing or 
organism. It is, in other words, a self-directed movement. In addition, it is something 
of which it makes sense to say the animal tried (perhaps unconsciously) to do it and 
failed or succeeded. So activities have success conditions.  
They do not, however, need to have a specific goal or telos which once 
achieved brings the activity to its completion, although they might. For instance, the 
activities of climbing the stairs or catching a ball have goals. For the first, the goal is 
to get to the top of the stairs and the activity terminates when this goal is achieved; for 
the second the goal is to catch the ball and the activity terminates when its goal is 
accomplished. Of course, these activities can also end in failure if the steps prove too 
high to climb or the ball too far to catch. By way of contrast, the activity of walking 
can be atelic in character at least in this sense: one can walk for the sake of walking 
without any particular further goal in mind. Here, the activity itself is its own goal and 
this why there is no goal which terminates the activity once achieved. Activities of 
                                                 
16
 For a similar characterisation see Nanay (2012, p. 431) 
Final Draft 
 
 - 15 - 
this atelic kind also have success conditions. For instance, an animal can try to walk 
over a boulder field and fail because of the unevenness of the terrain.17 
Further, these activities do not need to be consciously initiated or controlled as 
a result of a specific intention. Thus, the activities that can figure in affordances 
include those doings which are classified by Mark Rowlands as deeds. These are what 
he calls ‘pre-intentional acts’ because they are doings whose direct causes are not 
themselves intentional states and such that the general antecedent intention is not 
sufficient to individuate the deed (2006, p. 104). An example of such activities are a 
slip catch of a cricket ball when the ball is arriving at one’s midriff, so that one has to 
‘choose’ whether to point one’s fingers down or up when attempting to catch. The 
general intention guiding the activity in this example is to catch the ball but the 
intention does not specify the orientation of one’s fingers. Further, there is no time to 
form a conscious intention on this matter if one is to succeed in catching the ball. 
Another example is the skilful movement of the fingers of an expert pianist whilst 
playing a difficult piece. 
Saccadic eye movements are a further example of a deed or pre-intentional 
acts. They are deployed, for instance, to explore visually a picture or to keep track of 
the ball in sports such as cricket or baseball. Like other pre-intentional acts these are 
not merely bodily movement such as, for instance, a spontaneous movement of a 
tongue done for no reason whatsoever.18 Although subjects will not have formed any 
specific intention about where to move their eyes, the eye-movement is part of an 
overall activity which is intentional and either telic or atelic in the sense defined 
above. Thus, one might be visually exploring a picture, walking for pleasure, playing 
a piece of music on the piano, or trying to hit a ball with a bat. All of these activities 
are composed of sub-activities, several of which will fall under Rowlands’ definition 
of a pre-intentional act. These acts are executed because of the subject’s overall plan 
or intention, although there is no specific intention to move one’s eyes exactly so, or 
one’s foot, or fingers. These deeds have success conditions since they can fail in their 
contribution to the overall activity. Whilst exploring the picture one might mistakenly 
saccade onto the location of a fly on the adjacent wall, when descending a staircase 
                                                 
17
 For the distinction between these two kinds of activity see Crowther (2009) who deploys it to explain 
the idea of perception itself being an activity. 
18
 O’Shaughnessy refers to such movements as deeds or subintentional acts (1980, p. 60). He also 
argues that these acts are the result of non intentional tryings (1980, p. 96). I follow Rowlands’ choice 
here of reserving ‘deeds’ for pre-intentional acts (2006, p. 99) and in rejecting the view that sub-
intentional acts constitute genuine tryings (2006, p. 102). 
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one might stumble on a step because one’s motion was calibrated for a shallower step, 
or one might lose track of the ball before one can even try to hit it. In all of these 
instances we have doings which have success conditions; all of these deeds and 
actions are included among the activities that can be afforded to an animal by the 
environment. 
I should add that, although I develop my argument in terms of the notion of an 
affordance, the same or at least similar points could be made using Bence Nanay’s 
notion of a Q-able property of an object, where Q is a goal-directed action (2011 and 
2012). He defines these as relational properties of objects such as being edible or 
climbable.19 In his view these properties are represented in perceptual states which he 
calls ‘action-oriented’ and which are deployed in perceptually guided action (2012). 
He thus restricts his account to properties concerning only intentional telic activities. I 
think that these restrictions are unwarranted and, perhaps, a result of the mistaken 
assumption that only intentional actions with a goal can have success conditions.20 
 
 
4. Experiencing Affordances 
 
This section aims to accomplish four things. First, it provides an account of the 
phenomena highlighted by Block as examples of experiences of affordances. 
According to this account the deployment of covert spatial attention alters the 
appearance of contrast, colour saturation and flicker rate because it allows new 
affordances concerning saccades to be experienced. Second, it offers some evidence 
for the plausibility of this account. Third, it shows how the account is a rebuttal of 
Block’s argument in so far as it points to the existence of (A) a property which is 
experienced when the object’s location is covertly attended, but not experienced when 
the object’s location is unattended and (B) of a kind to which there can be a 
corresponding phenomenal look capable of explaining the phenomena. Fourth, it 
addresses the obvious objection that the property invoked in the account defended 
here is not a genuine property but rather a mode or manner of representing things. If 
                                                 
19
 It should be noted that insofar as being edible is relative to the interests and needs of an animal I 
would not consider it as an affordance proper. That said, I see no particular reason why these properties 
also should not figure in perception. 
20
 It is also possible that Nanay might think of walking for walking-sake as a goal-directed activity 
whose goal is the activity itself. 
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this objection were correct, this account would also invoke mental paint in all but 
name. 
In what follows I first discuss those experiments that are concerned with the 
phenomenology of contrast before considering similar experiments about gap size, 
colour saturation and flicker rate. In this context it is significant to note at the outset 
that, with the exception of one study on contrast appearance (Liu et al, 2009), all of 
Carrasco’s experiments concern exogenous or involuntary covert spatial attention. 
This point is of significance because the premotor theory of covert attention, which I 
have already mentioned in section 1 above, has received substantial empirical 
confirmation as an account of this kind of attention.21 
Carrasco thinks of perceived contrast (with which she is concerned) as 
tantamount to salience (Carrasco, Ling, and Read, 2004, p. 308).22 This interpretation 
of the notion of contrast, which undoubtedly encourages explanations invoking 
mental paint, helps to understand the kind of phenomenology Carrasco is concerned 
with. When she claims that a Gabor patch looks as having higher contrast when its 
location is attended to, she takes that claim to mean something which could also be 
described  by saying that the patch is experienced as more salient. What she has in 
mind, then, cannot be the technical notion of contrast (see note 8), but something 
closer to the thought that a Gabor patch stands out more against its background when 
its location is attended to than it would if its location were unattended. Thus, there is 
no doubt that some of Carrasco’s explanations of her results might encourage the line 
of thought preferred by Block. However, his approach is not compulsory, and the 
phenomenon can be explained differently. 
If you, like me, tend to see Gabor patches as if they were folds in a carpet with 
the darker parts as if in the shadow and the lighter parts as if they were brightly 
illuminated ridges, then those patches that look to have the higher contrast are those 
which stand out in this sense: the edges look higher whilst the valleys deeper. There is 
                                                 
21
 Carrasco and her team are not supporters of this theory of attention. Instead, Carrasco appears to 
favour the biased competition model (Carrasco, 2011, p. 1486-7). Nevertheless, the premotor theory of 
attention is not ruled out as incorrect by Rolfs and Carrasco in their 2012 which advances evidence that 
supports the dissociation of covert attention and saccadic preparation based on the timings of effects of 
saccadic preparation which were faster than those of either kind of covert attention (2012, p. 13751). 
The behavioural results discussed here, however, do not offer direct support for any specific theory of 
the computational or neurological mechanisms underpinning attention. Instead, they highlight some 
conscious phenomena concerning attention which any theory of attention would need to be able to 
explain. 
22
 Recall that ‘perceived’ in this context is used as broadly equivalent to ‘consciously perceived’ or 
‘experienced’. 
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no separate and distinct experience, at least for me, that the darker parts also look 
even darker when the location of the patch is attended to. Instead, the whole patch 
simply jumps out more against its background. I take it that this is the phenomenology 
of the participants in Carrasco’s experiments too when they have to judge in a split 
second the orientation of the patch that looks to have the higher contrast. 
This idea of a Gabor patch standing out more or less against its background 
can be fleshed out quite naturally using the language of affordances. We can capture 
this sense of standing out in terms of the ease with which we can shift our eyes so that 
we look straight at the patch.23 The patch, then, would be experienced as affording 
moving one’s eyes (that is, saccading either intentionally or pre-intentionally) to its 
location. I am not aware of any commonly adopted term to describe this affordance. 
For the purpose of this paper, I coin the admittedly inelegant expression ‘gaze-ability’ 
for cases where an object o in situation s affords being gazed for animal a. 
Gaze-ability like many other affordances is not categorical. Thus, for example, 
although it is true that a ball is either catcheable or it is not, it also true that it can be 
more or less easy to catch. In the same manner it might be easier or harder to fixate 
one’s eyes on a given location. The level of ease (or difficulty) must be a function of 
at least two features: effort of moving one’s eyes to the location and objective features 
of the target of the movement which might make it easier or harder to spot against its 
background. Hence, Gabors that are objectively more contrasty than others appear 
easier to direct one’s gaze upon as their locations will be easier to spot. Similarly, 
Gabors whose locations are attended to will be easier to fixate on because the effort 
required to move one’s eyes toward them is less than the effort of directing one’s gaze 
elsewhere.24  
The basis for this latter claim is purely empirical. There is good evidence that 
intentional (or voluntary) saccades to a target cannot take place unless covert spatial 
attention has first been directed to that location (Hoffman and Subramaniam, 1995). 
So those objects whose location is already the focus of covert attention either 
endogenous or exogenous are easier to direct one’s gaze toward because no further 
preparation in form of a shift of covert spatial attention to their location is required for 
voluntary eye movement to take place. Hence, everything else being equal, objects 
                                                 
23
 We also experience it as, in some sense, demanding that we direct our eyes toward it. The object 
captures our attention and we are inclined to move our eyes so that we can take a look at it. 
24
 With exception of course of the location on which one’s eyes are currently fixated. 
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whose locations are covertly attended are more gazeable than other objects among 
those on which our eyes are not already fixated because it is less effortful to saccade 
intentionally to their locations. It is less effortful because in all other cases one must 
first covertly attend to the given location, and to do so requires some effort.  
However, not all saccadic eye movements are intentional; some are pre-
intentional. In these latter cases we do not form a specific intention to move our eyes 
to a given location. Rather, the saccade is part of an overall pattern of activity which 
is initiated and controlled by intentions. In these cases also the direction of covert 
attention to a location makes it less effortful to move one’s eyes in that direction. 
There is strong evidence that motor preparation is both necessary and sufficient for 
exogenous or transient covert attention to be deployed (Smith and Schenk, 2012, sect 
3 and 4). In these cases then the direction of covert attention to a location is always 
accompanied by motor preparation for moving one’s eyes to the location. Hence, 
when the eyes do move, less effort is required to execute the movement. Indeed, effort 
might be required to inhibit eye movement from taking place. The empirical evidence, 
however, also indicates that motor preparation is sufficient but not necessary for the 
deployment of voluntary covert spatial attention (Smith and Schenk, 2012, sect 4). 
Hence, voluntary covert attention could be deployed without any motor preparation 
taking place. However, attention is necessary for motor preparation of saccadic eye 
movement in the sense that if the saccades are prepared, attention is subsequently 
deployed. In other words, if one were to try pre-intentionally to saccade one would 
succeed only if attention were deployed to the relevant location. Hence, attention 
makes the execution of movement less effortful, since for the movement to succeed 
attention would first have to be engaged. Of particular relevance in this context is also 
the finding by Rolfs and Carrasco (2012) that motor preparation for saccadic eye 
movement alone also alters the appearance of contrast in the same way in which it is 
altered by the deployment of covert attention.25 
This account can be extended to explain Carrasco’s other results concerning 
gap size (Gobell and Carrasco, 2005), colour saturation (Fuller and Carrasco, 2006) 
and flicker rate (Montagna and Carrasco, 2006). Experiments indicate that subjects 
experience the size of gap in the contour of a geometrical shape to be bigger when its 
                                                 
25
 It must be added that the ability to move one’s eyes is essential to covert spatial attention. Patients 
suffering from paralysis of the eye (ophtalmoplegia) suffer from deficits of exogenous attention (Smith 
and Schenk, 2012, p. 6). 
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location is attended to (see Fig. 3). They also perceive colours to be more vivid at 
attended locations. Whilst the flicker rate of Gabor patches which oscillate right-left 
(rather than on-off) appears faster when covert attention is captured to their locations. 
 
Fig 3. 
 
 
With regard to gap size, Gobell and Carrasco write that ‘attention increases the 
perceived distance between the ends of the two line stimuli—it makes the gap bigger, 
thereby easier to localize’ (2005, p. 650). Without taking issues with this construal of 
what is occurring, the results highlighted by Witt and Proffitt with regard to perceived 
size of a baseball, suggest an adjustment to this description. 
Participants experience as bigger the gap which stands out the most for them; 
the one which they find easier to locate. Subjects, in other words, experience as being 
larger the gap which is easier to direct one’s gaze toward when the difference in size 
between the two gaps is either quite small or non-existent.26 I do not, however, wish to 
deny that the attended gap looks bigger. Rather, my contention is that looking bigger 
is precisely what a gap which looks easier to view looks like. In the same way, I wish 
to claim that baseball players whose batting average is high judge the ball to be bigger 
because, looking bigger is what a ball that looks easy to hit looks like. Of course, 
these claims need further clarification as well as more argumentation in support. It is 
the burden of the final section of this paper to provide both of these. For now, I wish 
to turn to Carrasco’s results with regard to colour saturation and flicker rate. About 
the first, Carrasco’s findings indicate that the colours of coloured patches appear more 
vivid when their locations are attended to. Thus red patches appear redder and green 
ones greener. This result also can be explained along similar lines. The red patch 
looks redder because it stands out more; and redder is what a red patch looks like 
when it looks easier to gaze at. 
                                                 
26
 I do not mean my comments here to be read as claiming that Carrasco’s results are due to cue bias 
which she ruled out in a control experiment. In other words, participants do not select the gap that is 
attended merely because it is attended. What I suggest is that they select the gap that affords gazing 
more easily. 
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The last of Carrasco’s results which I wish to consider is different as it 
concerns a temporal dimension of perception. Gabor patches that flicker horizontally 
appear to flicker faster when their location is attended to. My account offers some 
explanation for this surprising finding.  
Since this result concerns transient or exogenous covert attention, motor 
preparation for saccading to the target location will accompany attentional capture. As 
the Gabor patch is flickering, it is perceived as vibrating horizontally. Thus, it is 
experienced as affording fixation only with difficulty. It is gaze-able, but as its 
position seems to keep changing, it is hard to move one’s eyes so as to fixate them to 
its location. What I would like to suggest here is that this difficulty in directing one’s 
eyes toward and keeping track of the object is experienced as a difference in the rate 
of movement of the patch. Seeming to flicker faster or move around quicker then, 
would be what being harder to keep one’s eyes fixed on an object’s location as it 
moves around looks like. 
The account offered here then points to the existence of properties which (A) 
are perceived when the object is at the attended location, but not otherwise, and (B) 
are of a kind to which there is corresponding phenomenal look capable of explaining 
Carrasco’s results. These properties are affordances. Their existence gives to both 
representationists and direct realists an opportunity to rebut Block’s argument. Strictly 
speaking, in order to block the argument, it would be sufficient to show that there is a 
property that could be invoked to show that premise 4 of the argument in either of its 
guises is false. In this section I have aimed to go further and show that there are good 
reasons to believe that the phenomena under discussion are best explained by 
counting affordances among the objects of experience.27 
It may be objected to the account developed so far that it invokes mental paint 
in all but name. Gaze-ability, it may be said, pertains to the manner of experiencing 
things or to the mode of representing them in conscious perception rather than to what 
is so experienced. After all, it might be added, what makes a given object gazeable or 
a hill climbable is never just a matter of the object’s location or of the incline of the 
slope but also a matter of the subject’s ability to move her eyes or of her level of 
fitness. In response, whilst it should be granted that action-scaled affordances, 
                                                 
27
 Or perhaps, more weakly, my argument shows that if we admit affordances among the possible 
objects of experience, their inclusion makes available a plausible explanation of the phenomena under 
discussion. 
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understood as comprising a measure of the effort that would be required to carry out 
the action, are not determined by retinal input, it should be retorted that affordances 
are genuine relational properties of things within a given situation.28 The experience 
of a hill as being very steep, even if the perceived steepness depends both on actual 
incline and effort given one’s level of fitness, is not a matter of a mode or manner of 
representing things. It is, instead, the experience of a relational property of the hill, 
which it retains when no one is experiencing it. In this way affordances differ from 
modes of representing objects such as experiencing things as fuzzy when one is very 
short-sighted and is not wearing corrective lenses.  
It is true that Carrasco sometimes describes the phenomenology uncovered by 
her experiments as concerning increased salience; it is equally true that salience is a 
mode of experiencing rather than something which is experienced. But as I have 
argued above the vocabulary of salience is best re-interpreted in terms of a specific 
affordance that concerns saccadic eye movement; this re-interpretation makes it 
explicit that what is experienced is a property of things to afford moving one’s eyes to 
their location so that one can look straight at them. 
It might at this point be worth recalling Block’s additional consideration in 
support of explaining Carrasco’s findings in term of mental paint. This is his claim 
that the changes in phenomenology he is discussing do not even look like changes in 
the world (Block, 2010, p. 53). The account developed here can make sense of this 
intuition. Because affordances do not depend solely on the objective properties of 
things in their layout but also on the motor abilities of perceivers, their perceptual 
detection cannot depend exclusively on retinal input; either stored information about 
the subject’s motor ability or information derived by the subject’s actual movement in 
its environment is also required.29 The change is not perceived as a change in the 
world because it does not concern the world’s intrinsic properties. Whatever change 
there is concerns only some of its relational features which are not determined by 
retinal input alone. 
 
 
                                                 
28
 Gibson also thought that the information required to specify an affordance was to be found both in 
the optic flow and in the subject so that this form of exteroception includes a proprioceptive 
component. 
29
 For empirical evidence that in some cases the information is gathered ‘on the fly’ on the basis of the 
perceiver’s actual movements see Fink et al., (2009). 
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5. What looking easier to look at looks like 
 
In this section I argue that the phenomenal looks associated with affordances are of 
the right sort to explain the phenomena highlighted by Block. That is, I defend the 
view that looking to have higher contrast, more colour saturation, to be a bigger gap is 
what being easier to gaze looks like. In the course of developing an argument for this 
conclusion, I shall explore further the question as to whether these cases are best 
understood as illusions or as perceptions. 
This argument is particularly pressing because Block’s argument against 
representationism rests on the claim that there is no property which is represented in 
perception and is also of the right sort to determine the character of the given 
experience. In Block’s original example the property in questions needs to be of the 
sort that explains why the look of the patch changes in the dimension of contrast. 
Since the account developed here might seem not to supply a property of the right 
kind, it would appear vulnerable to the same objection. The difference that needs 
explaining, Block may add, is one of experienced contrast and not that of experience 
gaze-ability. 
The issues raised by this objection cannot be settled one way or another by 
means of introspection alone (Cf., Schwitzgebel, 2008). Current debates about how to 
account for colour or shape constancy effects suffice to teach us this lesson. For 
instance, the disagreement between those who claim that a tilted coin looks elliptical 
and those who claim that it looks like a tilted round coin cannot be solved simply by 
focusing introspectively on the character of the given experience. Instead, one must 
also consider how the attributed look fits into an account which is consistent with the 
empirical evidence and has considerable explanatory power. In order to defend the 
claim that the phenomenology of affording moving one’s eyes so as to fixating them 
on the object is what is being described when one says that a patch looks to have 
higher contrast or its colour looks to be more more saturated, I want to consider first 
the phenomenal character of the visual experiences of walkers who, while wearing a 
heavy backpack, judge a hill to be steeper than it is thought to be by their 
unencumbered counterparts.  
Bhalla and Profitt note that human subjects in general overestimate the 
steepness of a hill when asked to report it verbally in units of degrees or visually by 
adjusting the moving part of a disk that represents the cross section of the hill in terms 
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of an angle. Normally, a hill whose slant is 5° is reported as being about 20°, and one 
which is approximately 10° is thought to be roughly 30° (Bhalla and Profftt, 1999, p. 
1076). Subjects who are tired or are wearing a backpack are prone to even worse 
overestimates. In the backpack experiment subjects overestimated a 5° slant verbally 
by a further 19% and visually by an added 27% (p.1082). From these observations 
Bhalla and Profitt conclude that experience of slant is on the whole illusory because it 
is ‘highly exaggerated’ (p. 1092). The experience of the backpackers then would be 
even more illusory since it is even further off from the reality.30 
But Bhalla’s and Proffitt’s work also supports a different interpretation of 
these experiences. This is an interpretation that Proffitt himself adopts in a later 
discussion without taking it to be in tension with the claim about exaggerated 
experience (2003, p. 106). Human subjects do not experience (or at least not solely) 
geographical slant, such as the steepeness of a hill, in units of degrees; instead, they 
experience it in units of the effort (or physiological potential) it would take to walk up 
it. Effort so conceived is a function of the objective steepness of the incline and the 
subject’s motor abilities as determined by generic facts about human biomechanics 
and specific facts about individuals such as their level of fitness, whether they are 
rested, whether they carry a load, and so forth. However, if subjects visually 
experience slant in terms of effort, it seems plausible to conclude that these 
experiences are veridical. All subjects accurately perceive visually how hard it would 
be for them to walk up the hill. It is harder for those wearing a backpack. That is why, 
they experience the hill to be steeper than subjects who are not being weighted down 
by a load.31 
These considerations support seeing the erroneous verbal and visual reports as 
resulting from false beliefs generated in the attempt to translate accurate visual 
experience in terms of efforts into representations of the same slant expressed in 
degrees. The supposition that visual experiences of slant are veridical, despite leading 
to the formation of false beliefs, is corroborated a few of considerations. 
                                                 
30
 Yet, as Bhalla and Profitt also notice, subjects do not stumble over when they attempt to climb hills. 
This fact is taken by Bhalla and Profitt as evidence of the existence of a dual visual system. One system 
controls visually guided activities such as the fine calibration of the angle of the foot when walking 
uphill; the other conscious system guides the planning of molar behaviours such as gait selection 
(Bhalla and Proffitt, 1999, pp. 1076-7). For the classic statement of the dual system theory see Milner 
and Goodale (2006). It should be noted that attention is thought to play a crucial role in how the two 
systems interact. 
31
 I am not aware of any results connecting the heaviness of the load to the perception of steepness. Be 
that as it may, there need not be a precise transformation between the two. 
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First, the presumption that subjects experience slant in terms of how easily it 
affords walking up or down makes sense of a range of findings. Generally 30° is 
roughly the steepest slant humans can walk up (as opposed to scramble), although this 
slant is already too steep to walk down safely (Proffitt et al. 1995, p. 409). So we 
would expect hills to look steeper when we look down at the slope from the top. This 
is what Proffitt has found (Proffitt et al. 1995, p. 426). Further, hills are harder to walk 
up if one is tired, one is unfit or wears a heavy load; these are precisely the conditions 
in which subjects perceive hills to be even steeper than other subjects do (Bhalla and 
Proffitt, 1999). Second, given the role of visual experience in the planning of action, 
sensitivity to the level of effort it would take to walk up a hill makes evolutionary 
sense. There is an advantage in being able to gauge whether we are able to walk to the 
top of a hill, jump over a torrent, squeeze through a gap (Reed, 1996, ch. 2). Empirical 
evidence suggests that this sensitivity is perceptual in character because it is 
insensitive to belief since knowing about the effects revealed by Proffitt makes no 
difference to the perception of slant. Third, Bhalla and Proffitt have found that 
subjects are much less sensitive to changes in steepness of inclines that are not within 
the walkable range. 
The lesson to be learned from these cases is that the phenomenal character of 
visual experiences is shaped by affordances so that when we say that a hill looks very 
steep what we describe is the phenomenology of affording walking up only with 
difficulty. Similarly, when the in-form baseball player describes his perception of the 
ball as being as a big as a melon, he is trying to express in words the phenomenology 
of affording hitting with ease.32 This lesson can now be applied to the results of 
Carrasco’s experiments. 
In this context it is worth recalling that there is empirical evidence that 
saccadic eye preparation alters appearance of contrast as does covert attention (Rolfs 
and Carrasco, 2012). The defence of the account proposed here does not, however, 
need to rest solely on this result. Instead, it gains also support from its ability to 
explain Block’s observation that the experience of a change in contrast is not 
experienced as a change in the world. Paradoxically the subject experiences the 
contrast of the patch as having both changed (because it looks different) and not 
                                                 
32
 Or at least this is the conclusion that one should draw given the analogy with the perceived steepness 
of slopes. So contrary to initial intuitions, the in-form player sees the ball bigger because he is in-form, 
his form is not caused by seeing the ball to be bigger. 
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changed.33 Yet the paradox disappears if we note that perceived contrast is a function 
of both objective contrast (defined as the result of subtracting the lower luminance 
from the higher luminance and dividing by the average luminance) and amount of 
effort required to move one’s eyes to the location of the object. When we covertly 
attend to the location of a patch, the contrast of the patch appears higher than it would 
otherwise, because the patch is easier to gaze straight at. The experience of 
diminished effort is the experience of the patch as standing out more clearly. 
However, the patch is also experienced as not having changed in contrast because its 
objective contrast has not changed. The situation is thus analogous to that of a subject 
who visually experiences the steepness of a hill before wearing a heavy backpack and 
then whilst carrying the load. On the one hand, she will experience the hill as being 
steeper, but on the other hand as not having changed. What has changed is the effort it 
would take to walk up it and this is the change which is reflected in the 
phenomenology. 
We have learnt from the literature on performance efficacy that things look 
bigger when they are easier to hit; they look steeper when they are harder to walk up. 
This lesson can be applied to the results concerning covert attention. Covertly 
attended gaps are easier to gaze which is why they look bigger; covertly attended 
Gabors are also easier to gaze which is why they look to have higher contrast. In sum, 
bigger, more contrasty, more saturated is what looking easier to look at looks like.34 
 
 
References: 
 
Allport, A. (1993) ‘Attention and Control. Have We Been Asking the Wrong 
Questions? A Critical Review of Twenty-Five Years.’ In Attention and Performance 
xiv, edited by David E. Meyer and Sylvan Kornblum, Boston, MA: MIT Press, 183-
218. 
 
                                                 
33
 This phenomenon is thus difference from constancy effects concerning shape or colour where one 
experiences something as having changed such as the relative position of the object or the illumination 
conditions. 
34
 Acknowledgments 
Final Draft 
 
 - 27 - 
Anton-Erxleben, K., C. Henrich, and S. Treue. (2007). ‘Attention changes perceived 
size of moving visual patterns’. Journal of Vision, 7(11), Article 5. Available from 
http://www.journalofvision.org/7/11/5/ 
 
Balcetis, E. and D. Dunning. (2010) ‘Wishful Seeing.’ Psychological Science 21 (1) : 
147-52. 
 
Bhalla, M. and D. R. Proffitt. "Visual-Motor Recalibration in Geographical Slant 
Perception." Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance 
25, no. 4 (1999): 1076-96. 
 
Block, N. (1995) "On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness." Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences 18, 2: 227-47. 
 
Block, N. (2010) ‘Attention and Mental Paint.’ Philosophical Issues 20, 1: 23-63. 
 
Carrasco, M. (2011) ‘Visual Attention: The Past 25 Years.’ Vision Research 51(13), 
1484-525. 
 
Carrasco, M., S. Ling & S. Read (2004) ‘Attention alters appearance.’ Nature 
Neuroscience, 7, 308-313. 
 
Chemero, A. (2003) ‘An outline of a theory of affordances.’ Ecological Psychology, 15, 181-
195 
 
Crowther, T. (2009) ‘Watching, Sight, and the Temporal Shape of Perceptual 
Activity.’ Philosophical Review 118 (1), 1-27. 
 
Fink, Philip W., Patrick S. Foo, and William H. Warren. (2009) ‘Catching Fly Balls in 
Virtual Reality: A Critical Test of the Outfielder Problem.’ Journal of Vision 9, 13:1-
8. 
 
Fish, William. Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction, Routledge 
Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy. London ; New York: Routledge, 2010. 
Final Draft 
 
 - 28 - 
 
Fuller, S., and M. Carrasco. (2006) ‘Exogenous attention and color perception: 
Performance and appearance of saturation and hue’. Vision Research, 46, 4032–47. 
 
Gibson, J. J. (1986). The ecological approach to visual perception. Hillsdale, N.J. ; London: 
Erlbaum. 
 
Gobell, J., and M. Carrasco. (2005). ‘Attention alters the appearance of spatial 
frequency and gap size’. Psychological Science, 16, 644–51. 
 
Harman, G. (1990). ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’. Philosophical Perspectives, 
4, 31–52. 
 
Heft, H. (1989) ‘Affordances and the Body: An Intentional Analysis of Gibson’s 
Ecological Approach to Visual Perception.’ Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 
19, 1-30. 
 
Hoffman, J. E., and B. Subramaniam. (1995). ‘The role of visual-attention in saccadic 
eye-movements’. Perception & Psychophysics, 57(6), 787–795.  
 
James, W. (1890⁄1981). The Principles of Psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Kirsch, W. et al (2012) ‘Influence of Motor Planning on Distance Perception within 
the Peripersonal Space.’ PLoS ONE 7, 4 : 1-9 (e34880). 
 
Liu, T., S. Fuller and M. Carrasco. (2006). ‘Attention alters the appearance of motion 
coherence’. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 13, 1091–96 
 
Liu, T., J. Abrams and M. Carrasco (2009) ‘Voluntary Attention Enhances Contrast 
Appearance.’ Psychological Science, 20, 354-362. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1995) Phenomenology of Perception. Transl. by Colin Smith. 
London: Routledge. 
Final Draft 
 
 - 29 - 
 
Milner, A. D., and M. A. Goodale. (2006) The Visual Brain in Action. 2nd ed, Oxford 
Psychology Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Montagna, B., and M. Carrasco. (2006). ‘Transient covert attention and the perceived 
rate of flicker’. Journal of Vision, 6(9), Article 8. Available from 
http://www.journalofvision.org/6/9/8/ 
 
Moore, T., and M. Fallah (2001). ‘Control of Eye Movements and Spatial Attention.’ 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 98, 3 : 1273-76. 
 
Nanay, Bence. (2011) ‘Do We See Apples as Edible?’ Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 92 (3), 305-22. 
 
Nanay, B.(2012) ‘Action-Oriented Perception.’ European Journal of Philosophy 20 
(3), 430-46. 
 
O'Shaughnessy, B. (1980) The Will. 2 vol., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Prinzmetal, W., I. Nwachuku, L. Bodanski, L. Blumenfeld and N. Shimizu. (1997). 
‘The Phenomenology of Attention 2. Brightness and Contrast.’ Consciousness and 
Cognition 6 (2/3), 372-412. 
 
Proffitt, D. R., M. Bhalla, R. Gossweiler, and J. Midgett. (1995) ‘Perceiving 
Geographical Slant.’ Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 2 (4) : 409-28. 
 
Proffitt, D. R., J. Stefanucci, T. Banton, and W. Epstein. (2003) ‘The Role of Effort in 
Perceiving Distance.’ Psychological Science 14 (2), 106-12. 
 
Reed, Edward. (1996) Encountering the World: Toward an Ecological Psychology. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Final Draft 
 
 - 30 - 
Rizzolatti, G., L. Riggio, I. Dascola, and C. Umiltá  (1987) ‘Reorienting Attention 
across the Horizontal and Vertical Meridians: Evidence in Favor of a Premotor 
Theory of Attention.’ Neuropsychologia 25 (1, Part 1), 31-40. 
 
Rizzolatti, G., and L. Craighero. (1998) ‘Spatial Attention: Mechanisms and 
Theories.’ In Advances in Psychological Science, Vol. 2: Biological and Cognitive 
Aspects, edited by M. Sabourin, F. Craik and M. Robert, Hove: Psychology 
Press/Erlbaum, 171-98. 
 
Rolfs, M., and M. Carrasco (2012). ‘Rapid Simultaneous Enhancement of Visual 
Sensitivity and Perceived Contrast During Saccade Preparation.’ The Journal of 
Neuroscience 32, 40 : 13744-52. 
 
Rowlands, M. (2006) Body Language: Representation in Action. Cambridge, Mass. 
and London: MIT Press. 
 
Schwitzgebel, Eric. "The Unreliability of Naive Introspection." Philosophical Review 
117, no. 2 (2008): 245-73. 
 
Smith, D. T., and T. Schenk. (2012-in press) ‘The Premotor Theory of Attention: 
Time to Move On?" Neuropsychologia, doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.01.025 . 
 
Styles, E. A. (2006). The psychology of attention. Hove: Psychology Press. 
 
Tse, P. U. (2005) ‘Voluntary attention modulates the brightness of overlapping transparent 
surfaces.’ Vision Research, 45, 1095-1098. 
 
Turatto, M., M. Vescovi, and M. Valsecchi. (2007). ‘Attention makes moving objects 
be perceived to move faster’. Vision Research, 47, 166–78. 
 
Turvey, M. T. (1992) ‘Affordances and Prospective Control: An outline of the ontology.’ 
Ecological Psychology,4: 173-187. 
 
Watzl, S. (2011). ‘The Nature of Attention.’ Philosophy Compass 6 (11), 842-53. 
Final Draft 
 
 - 31 - 
 
Witt, J. K. & D. R. Proffitt (2005a) ‘See the Ball, Hit the Ball.’ Psychological 
Science, 16, 937-938. 
 
Witt, J. K., D. R. Proffitt & W. Epstein (2005b) ‘Tool Use Affects Perceived Distance, But 
Only When You Intend to Use It.’ Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
& Performance, 31, 880-888. 
 
Witt, J. K., and D. R. Proffitt. (2008) ‘Action-Specific Influences on Distance 
Perception: A Role for Motor Simulation.’ Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception & Performance 34, 6 : 1479-92. 
 
